Tax Protest, A Homosexual, and Frivolity: A Deconstructionist Meditation by Infanti, Anthony C.
University of Pittsburgh School of Law
University of Pittsburgh School of Law Working Paper Series
Year  Paper 
Tax Protest, A Homosexual, and Frivolity: A
Deconstructionist Meditation
Anthony C. Infanti∗
∗University of Pittsburgh School of Law, infanti@pitt.edu
This working paper is hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress) and may not be commer-
cially reproduced without the permission of the copyright holder.
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art4
Copyright c©2004 by the author.
Tax Protest, A Homosexual, and Frivolity: A
Deconstructionist Meditation
Anthony C. Infanti
Abstract
In this contribution to a symposium entitled Out of the Closet and Into the Light:
The Legal Issues of Sexual Orientation, I recount and then ponder the story of
Robert Mueller. Mueller, a gay man, spent more than a decade protesting the dis-
criminatory treatment of gays and lesbians under the Internal Revenue Code. As
a result of his tax protest, Mueller was jailed for more than a year, and then was
twice pursued by the IRS for taxes and penalties. In pondering Mueller’s story, I
consider it both as a telling example of the forcible closeting of gay and lesbian
issues in tax and as a signpost pointing in the direction of the next front in the
battle for gay rights.
1. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
2. Letter from the Internal Revenue Service to Eugene A Delgaudio, President, Public Advocate of the United
States, Inc. (June 14, 2004), available at http://www.publicadvocateusa.org/news/article.php?article=95 (last visited
July 28, 2004).   For reporting on the letter, see Allen Kenney, IRS:  Joint Filing Not Allowed for Same-Sex Married
Couples, 103 TAX NOTES 1466 (2004).
3. In particular, the  U.S. Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003),  striking down
Texas’ sodomy law, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2004),  legalizing same-sex marr iage.
4. See Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal Tax Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 129, 134–35 (1998)
(“Critical tax scholarship has made great str ides in br inging new per spectives to bear on  issues of tax policy.
Surprisingly absent from this progressive critique has been any extended discussion of the heterosexual bias imbedded
in the numerous tax provisions that reference a taxpayer’s marital  status.  Th is relative silence on matters of sexual
orien tation reinforces the heteronormative nature of the federal tax code and necessarily limits the depth of any analysis
of the marital provisions.” (footnote omitted—in the omitted footnote, Knauer ci tes the work of Patr icia Cain  as “a
noted exception” to the general lack of discussion of gay and lesbian issues in critical tax scholarship); Anthony C.
Infanti, The Internal Revenue Code as Sodomy Statute, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 763, 764 (2004) (noting that the
contributors to a 1998 symposium on crit ical tax theory “primar ily focused their attent ion on critical tax scholarship
exploring issues relating to race and gender” and that only one contributor focused “a significant amount of atten tion
on scholarship exploring issues relating to sexual orientation”); id. at 782 (“Thus, not satisfied that a mere slap in the
face would keep gay and lesbian couples in the tax closet, Congress apparen tly decided to deal them a body blow [by
enacting the Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7
(2004)], that would ensure that its hostility is clear and unmistakable.”);  id. at 789 (“Their task is not made any easier
by Congress or  the Internal  Revenue Service . . . ,  both of whom have been conspicuously silen t on the question of how
the tax laws should be applied to gay and lesbian couples.”).  
TAX PROTEST, “A HOMOSEXUAL,” AND FRIVOLITY:
A DECONSTRUCTIONIST MEDITATION
Anthony C. Infanti1
“Even though a state may recognize a union of two people of the
same sex as a legal marriage for the purposes within that state’s
authority, that recognition has no effect for purposes of federal law.
A taxpayer in such a relationship may not claim the status of a married
person on the federal income tax return.”
—The Internal Revenue Service2
When I was approached about making a contribution to this symposium, Out of the Closet
and into the Light:  The Legal Issues of Sexual Orientation, I was told that it had been inspired by
the recent, momentous developments in gay rights.3  Sadly, however, I worried that a contribution
discussing tax issues related to sexual orientation would provide too stark a contrast to the themes
of openness and freedom suggested by the t itle of the symposium.  I was afraid that any contribution
that I might make would be too somber, because tax is an area where gay and lesbian issues generally
remain shrouded in darkness, forcibly banished to the invisibility of the closet.4  
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This silence on gay and lesbian issues contributes, in part, to the anachronistic and myopic feel of tax.  See
Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow up to Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 518
(1994).  As Michael Livingston has noted:
If tax scholarship lags behind developments in economics and other social sciences, it is also
frequently behind the curve within the legal academy. With its emphasis on neutrality as a policy
goal, and its faith in analogical reasoning, tax scholarship recalls the world of the 1950s, when most
legal scholars produced essentially doctrinal work and a broad polit ical consensus prevailed
throughout the law schools.  The world has changed, but tax has remained behind, resulting in a
scholarship that is frequently quaint and isolated even  by law school standards. In particular, the
apolitical nature of tax scholarship, while responsible for much of the coherence and majesty of the
field, seems increasingly out of touch  with the remainder of the academy.
Michael A. Livingston, Reinventing Tax Scholarship:  Lawyers, Economists, and the Role of the Legal Academy , 83
CORNELL L. REV. 365, 383–84 (1998) (footnote omitted).
5. The organization, Public Advocate of the United States, In c., describes itself in the following terms:
A small but creative band of young conservatives with a network of volunteers, Public
Advocate confron ts the lies and disinformation of the l iberal establishment  in Washington and the
so-called Homosexual Lobby as it uses federal legislation to create a special class of American at the
expense of the traditional family.
We are . . . Again st same sex marriage, for the Boy Scouts, support the traditional marr iage
amendment to the U.S. Constitution, in favor of abolishing the pornographic National Endowment
for the Ar ts which uses public monies to sponsor “art”, exposing wasteful spending and supporting
tax cuts, opposing so-called Gay Rights and homosexual propaganda in general. . . .
PUBLIC ADVOCATE OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLIC ADVOCATE:  PROTECTORS OF FATHERHOOD, MOTHERHOOD,
CHILDREN, AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY, at http://www.publicadvocateusa.org/ (last visited July 28, 2004).
6.  President Bush only announced his support for a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage after the
Massachuset ts Supreme Judicial Cour t issued a decision legaliz ing same-sex marr iage, Goodridge v. Department of
Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003), and the City of San  Francisco began to issue marriage licenses to a deluge of
same-sex couples.  Elisabeth Bumiller, Same-Sex Marriage:  The President; Bush Backs Ban in Constitution on Gay
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at A1; Dean E. Murphy, San Francisco Forced to Halt Gay Marriages, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2004, at A1 (The City of San Francisco issued more than 4100 marriage licenses to same-sex couples
before the California Supreme Court ordered it to cease issuing such licenses, and an additional 2600 couples had made
appointments for a license before the order was issued. ).
7.  Letter from Eugene A. Delgaudio, President,  Public Advocate of the United States, Inc. to Mark W.
Everson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Internal Revenue Service (Apr. 13, 2004), available at
http://www.publicadvocateusa.org/news/article.php?article=89 (last visited July 28, 2004).  
8. Id.
Indeed, shortly after I began working on this piece, the IRS reaffirmed the invisibility of gay
and lesbian couples for U.S. federal tax purposes in a response to a letter from a conservative, “pro-
family” organization that opposes same-sex marriage.5  In the wake of the events that led to President
Bush’s endorsement of a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage,6 this organization had written the
Commissioner of the IRS to urge him to deter “married” same-sex couples (their quotes, not mine)
from attempting to file joint federal income tax returns.7  The organizat ion further urged the
Commissioner to investigate and prosecute any same-sex couples who do at tempt to file joint
returns.8  An excerpt from the IRS response to this letter serves as the epigraph to this piece.  In that
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9. See supra note 2.
10. Mueller v. Commissioner, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,205 (7th Cir. 2000); Mueller v.
Commissioner, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 764 (2001), aff’d, 2002-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,505 (7th Cir. 2002),  cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 1003 (2002); Mueller v. Commissioner, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1887 (2000), aff’d, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,391 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 887 (2001).
11. I came across two articles citing Mueller’s tax cases, but neither of them discusses his story in any depth.
See Michael T. Morley et al., Emerging Issues in Family Law, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 169, 194 n.200 (2003); Sarah
A. Shubert, Comment, Immigration Rights for Same-Sex Partners Under the Permanent Partners Immigration Act,
74 TEMPLE L. REV. 541, 544 n.29, 550 n.89, 559 n .181, 563 n.214, 566–67 (2001).
12. Albright v. Morton, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10110, at *1 (D. Mass. May 28, 2004) (“In 2004, a statement
implying that an individual is a homosexual is hardly capable of a defamatory meaning.”); see also Gay Libelous No
More?, ADVOCATE, July 6, 2004, at 15 (reporting on this case).  Mueller himself noted this in his petitions for writ
of certiorari filed with the U.S. Supreme Court.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mueller v. Commissioner, 2002 WL
32135138, at *11 (U.S. Sept. 24, 2002) (No. 02-513) (“Judge Pajak in his decision states ‘(petitioner) is homosexual.’
The Petitioner has been so identified by many federal courts, being no stranger in challenging the stance of the federal
government to this group.  Twenty years ago this would have been a demeaning accusation.  Through the evolution
of society, that means only that petitioner has standing.”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mueller v. Commissioner,
2001 WL 34115848, at *10 (U.S. July 5, 2001) (No. 01-44) (“Judge Laro in his decision states ‘Petitioner is
homosexual.’  Twenty years ago this would have been a demeaning accusation.  Through the evolution of society, that
means only that petitioner has standing.” ).
excerpt, the IRS reassures the conservative organizat ion that same-sex couples legally married under
state law “may not claim the status of a married person on the federal income tax return.”9
This disturbing correspondence only reinforced the impression left on me by a set of cases that
immediately came to mind when I learned of the topic of this symposium.  As we will see, these
cases10 partially (in both senses of the word) recount the story of Robert Mueller, a gay man and “tax
protester” whose story appears to have gone largely unnoticed by academics.11  After much thought,
and despite my worries and fears, I decided that a retelling and pondering of Mueller’s story would
serve as a particularly appropriate contribution to this symposium, because his story not only provides
a compelling illustration of the forcible closeting of gay and lesbian issues in tax, but also points us
in the direction of the next front in the battle for gay rights—a battle that may just allow us to kick
the tax closet door open and finally let in the light.
I.  TAX PROTEST
But before we can begin Mueller’s story, a bit of a digression is necessary.  In describing
Mueller above, I referred to him as a gay man and a “tax protester.”  Apparent ly, I no longer need
to worry about adversely affecting your views of Mueller by referring to him as a gay man.12  I do,
however, worry that labeling him a “tax protester” may unwarrantedly taint your view of him.  In fact,
out of this concern, I have even hesitated to refer to Mueller as a “tax protester” at all.  And, until
now, I have placed this label in quotation marks in the hope that you will resist the temptation to
allow these words to conjure in your mind the associations that they normally evoke when you hear
them or read them.  So, for the next several pages, please do me the favor of holding this label in
abeyance in your mind, and allow me to explain why I hesitate to use it.
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13. E.g., Susan Clary, IRS Says Dentist Evaded Taxes, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Sept. 21, 1999, at D3;
Terry Horne, Man Loses Home, Freedom for Skipping Taxes, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 3, 2000, at 1B; David Cay
Johnston, U.S. Warning to Businesses on Tax Protest, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2001, at C1; Thomas Korosec, Businessman
Gets 7 Year Term for Tax Protest, HOUS. CHRON., May 1, 2004, at A33; Torsten Ove, Jurors Hear of Tax Protest; IRS
Says Failure to Pay Deliberate, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 19, 2002, at A13; Liz Pulliam Weston, Money Talk:  The
Federal Government Is Not Amused by Tax Protests, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, § 3, at 3; Tom Zeller, These Artful
Dodgers Doth Protest Too Much, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2001, § 4, at 5; see David Lupi-Sher, Antitax Promoters:   A
Close-Knit Group Preying on the Gullible, 85 TAX NOTES 1129, 1130 (1999) (describing a loose affiliation of extreme
right-wing organizations as the most importan t group of tax pr otesters during the last three decades); Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, For God and Country:  Taxing Conscience, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 939, 942 [hereinafter Kornhauser, Taxing
Conscience] (referring to this group as “[s]tandard tax protesters”); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Not All Tax Protesters
Are Cheats and Crooks, 85 TAX NOTES 1469 (1999) [hereinafter Kornhauser, Cheats and Crooks] (responding to Lupi-
Sher’s article, but acknowledging that the group of extreme right-wing tax protesters “may be more important
numerically”); ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, EXTREMISM IN AMERICA:  TAX PROTEST MOVEMENT, at
http://www.adl.org/ learn/Ext_US/TPM.asp (last visited July 28, 2004) (“The tax protest movement, originating in the
1950s and 1960s , is the oldest right-wing anti-government movement still in existence in the United States and one
of the most active.  Along with the better -known militia and sovereign citizens movements, the tax protest movement
is a key component of the strain of extreme right-wing anti-government activism often referred to as the ‘patriot’
movement.”); FINANCIAL AND TAX FRAUD EDUCATION ASSOCIATES, INC., QUATLOOS!  SCAMS & FRAUDS EXPOSED:
TAX PROTESTORS. at http://www.quatloos.com/Tax_Protestors_Page.htm (last visited July 28, 2004).
14. (a) PROHIBITION.—The officers and employees of the Internal Revenue Service—
(1) shall not designate taxpayers as illegal tax protesters (or any similar
designation); and
(2) in the case of any such designation made on or before the date of the
enactment of this Act— 
(A) shall remove such designation from the individual master
file; and
(B) shall disregard any such designation not located in the
individual master  file.
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3707, 112 Stat. 685, 778
(1998).
15. I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(A)(v) (2004).
16. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., DEP’T OF TREASURY, FISCAL YEAR 2004 STATUTORY
AUDIT OF COMPLIANCE WITH LEGAL GUIDELINES PROHIBITING THE USE OF ILLEGAL TAX PROTESTER AND SIMILAR
DESIGNATIONS (2004), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/tigta/2004reports/200440109fr.html (last visited July 28,
2004).
A. The Stigma
Although, technically speaking, quite an apposite designation for Mueller, the tax protester
label that I have applied to him may have immediately conjured in your mind the image of a crackpot,
deadbeat, or charlatan (and, if it didn’t, I’m afraid that I’ve just now done it for you).13  So tainted
is the label that Congress has prohibited the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from referring to anyone
as an “illegal tax protester” or “any similar designation.”14  As explained by the Treasury Inspector
General for Tax Administration, who is charged with monitoring compliance with this prohibition,15
“[t]he Congress had concerns that some taxpayers were being permanently labeled and stigmatized
by the [illegal tax protester] designation.”16
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17. In the United States, anti-tax sentiments, along with anti-government sentiments
generally, are an intrinsic aspect of American patriotism and national character.
. . . Americans celebrate their patriotism and commitment to liber ty through
resistance—often violent resistance—to taxes. . . . This patriotic aversion to taxes
helps explain why Americans vociferously complain about over-taxation despite
the fact that they are one of the least taxed developed nations.
Given the centr ality of tax rebellion s in America’s h istory, it is  not
surprising that tax rhetoric is frequent—and frequently heated.  It is inextricably
intertwined with America’s conception  of democracy, often serving as a
“lightening rod” [sic] for politics.
Marjorie Kornhauser, Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution:  The Role of Tax Protests and Anti-Tax Rhetoric in
America, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 819, 824 (2002) ( footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Kornhauser, Anti-Tax Rhetoric]; see also
Christopher S. Jackson, The Inane Gospel of Tax Protest:  Resist Rendering unto Caesar—Whatever His Demands,
32 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 294 (1996–97) (“[Justice-based] [t]ax protesters view themselves as patriots following the
standards set by our forefathers.”); Kirk J. Stark, The Right to Vote on Taxes, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 191 (2001) (“One
cannot study American history for long before noticing the conspicuous role of tax revolts.  Time and gain Americans
have turned mutinous against taxes—the Boston Tea Party, Whisky Rebellion, the Depression-era tax strikes.  ‘Tax
revolts,’ as one commentator put it, ‘are as American as 1776.’” (quoting Joseph D. Reid, Jr., Tax Revolts in Historical
Perspective, 32 NAT’L TAX J. 67, 69 (1979)) (footnotes omitted)); Lupi-Sher, supra note 13, at 1130 (“These promoters
like to refer to themselves as this generation’s ‘Founding Fathers,’ rebelling against a tyrannical government.  And
they are more than willing to share their proprietary information in exchange for money.  Through seminars and
conferences, the promoters advertise their wares.  They constantly seek funds to defeat the U.S. government.”).
18. See Kornhauser, Anti-Tax Rhetoric, supra note 17, at 840–51; Stark, supra note 17, at 191.
19. DIST. OF COLUMBIA, MOTOR VEHICLES:  TAXATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION PLATES, at
http://dmv.dc.gov/serv/plates/tax.shtm (last visited July 28, 2004).
20. Brian MacQuarrie, For D.C. Delegates, a Modern Tea Party, BOSTON GLOBE, July 27, 2004, at C4.
21. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
That a stigma is attached to the “tax protester” label may seem odd, given that  tax revolts and
rebellions have played an important role in the history of the United States.17  The Boston Tea Party,
Shays’ Rebellion, the Whiskey Rebellion, and Fries’ Rebellion were all tax protests.18  Indeed, the
Boston Tea Party and its protest of “taxat ion without representation” have become iconic symbols
in the United States.  For example, to protest its lack of representation in Congress, the District of
Columbia allows its residents to purchase license plates emblazoned with this slogan,19 and the
District’s delegates to the Democratic National Convention this year replicated the original protest
by dumping tea into Boston harbor.20  Yet, despite the storied role of tax rebellion in U.S. history,
it seems that the phrase “tax protester” has come to be associated with an assortment of crackpots,
deadbeats, and charlatans who wish to tap into this nostalgia in order to legitimize (i) their assault on
government and its ability to impose taxes, (ii) their desire simply to avoid parting with their money,
or (iii) their exploitation of individuals who fall into one or both of the latter two groups.21
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22. Kornhauser, Anti-Tax Rhetoric, supra note 17, at 919.
Moreover, some of the protests a lso contain  an element present in other historic tax protests:  a
complaint not merely against the current form of the income tax or the income tax itself, but against
the justness of all tax and against the right of the government to impose it.  In other  words, these
protests concern the nature of the government which  in some instances rises to the level of
questioning the legitimacy of the government itself.  Tax is merely one battlefield in the struggle to
define the political structure of the government.
Id. at 906–07; Jackson, supra note 17, at 293–95 (making a distinction between those who engage in tax protest for
individual gain an d those who engage in tax protest because they are dissatisfied with government); Kornhauser,
Taxing Conscience, supra note 13, at 942–43 (“Standard tax protesters . . . refuse to pay tax because they resent having
to pay so much tax, because they oppose the concept  of the State in principle, or because they oppose the particular
government.”); Lupi-Sher, supra note 13, at 1130 (“The second and more important tax protest group is mostly found
in loosely affiliated extreme r ight-wing organizations.  This group claims that—based on interpretations of the U.S.
Constitution and the Internal Revenue Code—people do not have to pay income taxes.”).
23.  Jackson, supra note 17, at 293–95 (making a distinction between those who engage in tax protest for
individual gain and those who engage in tax protest because they are dissatisfied with government); Kornhauser,
Taxing Conscience, supra note 13, at 942–43 (“Standard tax protesters . . . refuse to pay tax because they resent having
to pay so much tax, because they oppose the concept of the State in principle,  or because they oppose the particular
government.”); Kornhauser, Anti-Tax Rhetoric, supra note 17, at 819 (“‘Do you know what it’s called when someone
else controls the fruits of your labor.  It is tax slavery by the government.’” (quoting Alan Keyes, candidate for the
Republican presidential nomination  in 2000)); id. at 821–22 (“Most people never pay their taxes voluntarily, in the
1.  Crackpots.  The individuals in the first of these three groups may be sincere in their beliefs,
but they are generally viewed as fringe elements of society who are trying to make a statement about
the nature of government:
There are a variety of direct tax protests ranging from not paying taxes, to threatening
IRS personnel to actual physical violence against IRS property or personnel.
Motivation for these protests range [sic] from frustration to a sincere belief that the
income tax itself is illegal. Some individuals act alone; others are part of semi-
organized movements. Many of these tax protesters are members or adherents of
radical right wing groups such as the Posse Comitatus, Christian Identity, Sovereign
Citizens, the common-law movement, the militia movement, and the Patriot
movement.  Some of these are violent; others not. All, however, hold similar views
about the size and role of government and its potential for corruption, including a
commonly held belief that any government beyond the county level is illegitimate and
must be resisted. The more extreme groups often form isolated communities complete
with their own governments, and feel justified in resisting the illegitimate laws of
unconstitutional state and federal governments, using arms if necessary.  These radical
protestors believe that it is they who are the true patriots, trying to return the country
to its authentic nature.22 
2.  Deadbeats.  Those in the second group are, however, less principled in their protest; they
just don’t seem to like the idea of being told what to do with their money.23  How else would you
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art4
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ordinary sense of the word.  Rather, they are generally anti-tax, in that they usually would prefer to keep any income
they receive than pay it to the government in taxes.”).
24. Helen Huntley, Anti-Tax Groups Hit Their Stride, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 24, 1996, at 1H; David
Cay Johnston, The Anti-Tax Man Cometh, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1995, at D1; Kathy M. Kristof, Ex-IRS Man Declares
Himself Tax-Exempt, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2004, at C1; Janet Novack, Protesters?  What Protesters? , FORBES, Mar.
5, 2001, at 122; David Rosenzweig, Author, Associates Guilty in Tax Avoidance Scheme , L.A. TIMES, May 4, 2004,
at B5; ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 13.
25. Lupi-Sher, supra note 13, at 1130–34; ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 13.
26. Purposivism and Eskridgean dynamism are two approaches to statutory interpretation.  Purposivists argue
that, when interpreting individual provisions within a statutory framework, the meaning or application  of the
provisions should be determined by looking to the purpose or structure of the statute as a whole.  See Deborah A. Geier,
Interpreting Tax Legislation:  The  Role of Purpose, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 492 passim (1995); see also Michael Livingston,
Practical Reason, “Purposivism,” and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 51 TAX L. REV. 677 passim (1996)
(discussing Geier’s purposivism).  In contrast, the dynamic approach to statutory interpretation  described by William
Eskridge takes into account “present societal, political, and legal context” when interpreting a statute. William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1482–98 (1987).    In the tax literature,
Michael Livingston has advocated the adoption of Eskridge’s dynamic approach to statutory interpretation (which
Livingston refers to as a “practical reason” approach).  Livingston, supra, at 720–24.
27. Kornhauser, Anti-Tax Rhetoric, supra note 17, at 823 (“From a practical standpoint, successful anti-tax
rhetoric increases non-compliance with tax laws which in turn can endanger the existence of the state by strangling
its means of support.”); id. at 827 (“In its most extreme form the [anti-tax] rhetoric often appears to attack not just the
current income tax or the particular politics of the party in power, but tax and government more generally.”).
28. The IRS has on its website a 54-page document  debunking the most common arguments directed against
the income tax.  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., THE TRUTH ABOUT FRIVOLOUS TAX ARGUMENTS, at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/friv_tax.pdf (last visited July 28, 2004); see also Jackson, supra note 17, at 300–21
(listing and briefly responding to a number of these arguments).
describe individuals who buy expensive tax protester books, videos, and other products in an effort
to avoid the payment of taxes?  Consider, for example, those who would purchase a “pure trust”
costing as much as $1,000 or an “Untax Package” costing as much as $2,500, along with those who
would even buy letters (at $50 each) to send to the IRS when contacted about their “avoided” tax
liabilities.24
3.  Charlatans.  The last group promotes or foments tax protest  by selling ideas and
arguments that no tax lawyer would sanction, exploiting and profiting from the first group’s distrust
of government and the second group’s naïveté.25  The ideas and arguments that they peddle (e.g., the
Sixteenth Amendment was not properly ratified, Federal Reserve Notes are not legal tender, only
foreign source income is taxable, or claiming to be a citizen of a given state and not a citizen of the
United States) are so wooden and torturous that they make the hypertextualist drafters of the now
ubiquitous corporate tax shelters seem like purposivists or Eskridgean dynamists.26  The intent of
these arguments is to undermine (and, in some cases, to annihilate)27 the authority of the government
to enact or impose the income tax (or any other tax).28
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29. Kornhauser, Cheats and Crooks, supra note 13; see also Kornhauser, Anti-Tax Rhetoric, supra note 17;
Kornhauser, Taxing Conscience, supra note 13.
30. See Kornhauser, Taxing Conscience, supra note 13, at 960 (“War tax resisters’ legal challenges to the
income tax differ from those of other tax protesters.  In contrast to the others, conscientious objectors rarely claim that
the income tax is unconstitutional or otherwise legally illegitimate.”); Colleen M. Garrity, Note, The Religious
Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act:  Becoming Conscious of the Need to Accommodate Conscience, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1229,
1229 (2003) (“Conscientious objectors to tax, unlike other tax protestors, generally accept the legal legitimacy of the
income tax.”).
31. Kornhauser, Taxing Conscience, supra note 13, at 950 (“Over the years, however, the Court has broadly
interpreted the religious exemption  in the draft laws to cover an  individual whose bel ief is not only religious, but also
moral and ethical . . . .  This broad interpretation is in keeping with an expansion of conscientious objection in western
countries, which today largely stems from secular rather than religious beliefs.”); id. at 987 (“the purpose and intended
effect [of the peace tax fund bills] has remained the same:   to allow taxpayers who are conscientious objectors to pay
their taxes without violating their moral, ethical, and religious beliefs”); Garrity, supra note 30, at 1239 (“Despite its
apparent plain meaning, the Supreme Court  has ruled that the Act’s exemption applies to both religious and secular
conscientious objectors.”).
32. Kornhauser, Taxing Conscience, supra note 13, passim.
33. Id. at 943–44.  War tax protesters are a varied group and engage in different strategies to resist financially
supporting the military.  These strategies include, among others:  making “contributions to religious, charitable, and
peace organizations”; “living below the taxable income level”; “joining or forming a support group”; “supporting war
tax resistance of others by contributing to a tax resisters’ penalty fund”; “paying federal income taxes but writing ‘paid
under  protest’ on the form”; and “paying the tax due but with a check made out to the Department of Health and
Human Services.”  Id. at 956–57; see also Garrity, supra note 30, at 1241–42 (“Conscientious objectors voice their
discontent with this use of tax dollars to fund the military in a multitude of ways.”).
B.  Avoiding the Stigma
But, as Marjorie Kornhauser has so forcefully pointed out, not all tax protesters can be
characterized as crackpots, deadbeats, or charlatans.29  There are others who do not readily come to
mind when you hear or read the words “tax protester,” but who clearly fall within the ambit of that
term.  What these individuals have in common, and what distinguishes them from the crackpots, the
deadbeats,  and the charlatans, is that they acknowledge the legitimacy of the taxes (particularly the
income tax) enacted by Congress.30
1.  Non-Tax Protest.  Some of these people use the tax system as a vehicle for non-tax
protest.  Most prominently, this group includes pacifists who, for religious, moral, or ethical
reasons,31 do not wish to support war—either directly (through military service) or indirectly (through
financial support).32  These war tax protesters frequently “seek no personal gain from not paying their
taxes because they either put their tax money in escrow or donate it to  peace-promoting
organizations.”33  Some have advocated accommodating this form of tax protest through the creation
of a peace tax fund, to which war tax protesters could direct their tax payments and the proceeds of
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34. Kornhauser, Taxing Conscience, supra note 13, at 982–1015; Garrity, supra note 30, at 1248–62;
Kornhauser, Cheats and Crooks, supra note 13.  The first peace tax fund bill was introduced in Congress in 1958.
Gar rity, supra note 30, at 1244.  Others are not,  however, quite so approving of war tax resister s and consider them
to be lawbreakers.  Sheldon S. Cohen, “Good” Protesters Are Stil l Lawbreakers, 86 TAX NOTES 127 (2000).
35. E.g., Jim Getz, 30-Year Tax Resister Will Refuse to Pay Again, Protesting War in Iraq; Not All Are
Prosecuted, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 15, 2003, at B3; Roselyn Tantraphol, Tax Statement:  Some War
Protesters Withhold Payments to IRS, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 13, 2003, at A1.
36. E.g., William P. Brown, Tax Fraud and Tax Protesters , 33 TAX ADVISER 790 (2002); Justice Department
Files Suit to Stop Slave Reparations Scams; IRS Warns Blacks to Beware, JET, Mar. 25, 2002, at 19; Scam Alert!,
ESSENCE, Aug. 2002, at 86.
37. See Michelle Boorstein, Va. Man, Daughter Get Prison for Slavery Tax Claim, WASH. POST, Oct. 24,
2003, at A10.
38. Carolyn C. Jones, Dollars and Selves:   Women’s Tax Criticism and Resistance in the 1870s, 1994 U. ILL.
L. REV. 265, 268–69, 275–88.
39. United States v. Mueller, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ¶ 50,205 (7th Cir. 2000).  Mueller is apparently not alone
in making this type of protest.  Tammye Nash, Lesbian Tells Tax Man to Take a Hike, GAY FIN. NETWORK, Mar. 22,
1999, at http://www.gfn.com/archives/story.phtml?sid=933 (last visited July 28, 2004).
40. Petitioner’s Brief at 4, Mueller v. Commissioner, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1887 (2000) (No. 15289-98).
41. Id.
42. There are a number of tax benefits and detriments associated with marriage.  See Knauer, supra note 4,
which would only be used to defray the cost of non-military act ivities of the government.34  As a
result of the preemptive war on Iraq in 2003, interest in war tax protest has recently increased.35
The group of individuals who engage in non-tax protest through the tax system also includes
those pressing claims for reparations for slavery.  While the reparations tax credit is generally viewed
as a scam,36 there are individuals who maintain that they claim the credit in order to protest the
treatment of African-Americans in the United States.37  
In addition, during the nineteenth century, woman suffragists refused to pay taxes in order to
protest their inability to vote, metaphorically invoking the “no taxation without representation” slogan
from the Boston Tea Party.38
2.  Protesting Tax Discrimination.  Other individuals acknowledge the legitimacy of the tax
laws, but protest their application to a specific group.  They seek to highlight and to remedy wrongful
discrimination codified in the Internal Revenue Code (Code) by Congress.  The story of Robert
Mueller is the story of just such a tax protester—which is precisely why I asked your indulgence in
allowing me to explain why, in this case, you shouldn’t immediately associate a pejorative connotation
with this label.  With this background (and hopefully with an open and untainted mind), we can now
proceed to consider the story of the tax trials and tribulations (and incarceration) of Robert Mueller,
“a homosexual.”39
II.  “A [THE] HOMOSEXUAL”
From 1975 until 1982, Robert Mueller was “in a traditional heterosexual marriage which
allowed the filing of joint returns and other benefits.”40  After that marriage ended in divorce, Mueller
“decided to stop hiding his homosexuality.”41  A few years later, angered by the fact that he could not
receive the same tax benefits in a same-sex relationship as he could while married to his wife,42
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at 160 (“an estimated 60 provisions on the income tax side alone” refer to a taxpayer’s marital status).  Among the
benefits are the ability to transfer property between spouses without triggering income, estate, or gift tax, I.R.C. §§
1041, 2056, 2523 (2004), and the ability to split income between the spouses for income tax purposes , id. § 6013 (i.e.,
to obtain what is colloquially referred to as a marriage “bonus,” see infra note 82).  Among the disadvantages are the
marriage “penalty,” see infra note 82, and the inability to obtain beneficial results from transactions between spouses,
see, e.g., I.R.C. § 267 (2004) (disallowing losses incurred in transactions between related parties, including spouses);
id. § 318(a)(1)(A)(i), - (b) (cross-referencing §§ 302, 958(b), and 6038(e)(2)) (attributing th e ownership of stock
between family members, including spouses, for a number of purposes in the Code—including determin ing whether
a redemption  of stock wil l be treated as a distribution  or exchange, whether  the controlled foreign corporation regime
will apply to a foreign corporation, and whether certain information must be furnished to the IRS with  respect to a
foreign corporation).
For a discussion  of the oppressive nature of th e federal treatment of same-sex couples, see Infanti, supra note
4, at 779–804.
43. Petitioner’s Brief at 4, Mueller (15289-98).
44. Id.  And this relationship appears to have been a difficult one—in the sense that Bates (with Mueller’s
help) appears to have battled a drug problem th roughout much, i f not all, of the period that the relationship continued.
See id. at 14.  At trial, Mueller indicated that he had suffered a theft loss during one of the year s in which he did not
file a tax return; Bates had apparent ly stolen his television to feed his drug habit.  Transcript of Trial at 33-36, Mueller
(15289-98); see also Mueller, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1888 n.1.
45. See Mueller, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1888; Mueller v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 764, 765 (2001).
46. Mueller, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1888.
47. According to the notice of deficiency issued by the IRS, Mueller’s combined employee and non-employee
compensation ranged from a low of $44,090 in 1986 to a high of $102,491 in  1991.  Petit ion at schedule 2, Mueller
v. Commissioner, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1887 (2000) (No. 15289-98).  On average, he earned approximately $84,500 each
year during the decade that this portion of the protest continued.  Id.
48. United States v. Mueller, 2001-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) ¶ 50,205, at  87,342 (2000); In formation, United Sta tes
v. Mueller, 96-CR-243 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 1996) (indicting Mueller under I.R.C. § 7203 with respect to calendar years
1989 through 1991).
49. Mueller, 2001-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) ¶ 50,205, at 87,342.  In 1999, Mueller’s supervised release was revoked
and he was ordered back to prison  for an additional 90 days, because he had violated the terms of his supervised release
by failing to file a U.S. federal income tax return for 1997.  Id.
Mueller ceased filing tax returns and paying taxes as a protest against his being limited to filing a tax
return as “single,” no matter what his actual relationship status.43  In 1989, Mueller entered into a
relationship with Todd Bates that continued throughout the remaining years of this tax protest.44
Mueller continued his protest for a decade; he did not file a tax return again until 1996.45
During this period, Mueller worked “as a computer programmer/consultant for various companies
and hospitals,”46 earning a relatively comfortable living.47  In 1996, however, the IRS finally caught
up with Mueller and charged him with three counts of willful failure to file an income tax return.48
In a trial before a magistrate judge in 1997, Mueller was convicted on all three counts “and sentenced
to a total of 13 months’ imprisonment and one year of supervised release.”49
A. Mueller I
In 1998, the IRS then pursued Mueller for the taxes that he owed for the years 1986 through
1995.  In its notice of deficiency, the IRS alleged that Mueller owed more than $249,000 in taxes and
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50. Mueller, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1887, 1888 (2000).
51. I.R.C. §§ 6601, 6622 (2004).  Mueller was assessed a penalty for failure to file a return under § 6651(a)(1)
as well as a penalty for underpayment of estimated taxes under § 6654.  Int erest on the penalty for failure to file a
return accrues beginning on the date when the return was required to be filed.  Id. § 6601(e)(2)(B).  Interest on the
penalty for underpayment  of estimated taxes only accrues from the date of the notice and demand therefor, and only
if that penalty is not paid within  twenty-one calendar days (reduced to ten calendar days under certa in circumstances)
from the date of the notice and demand.  Id. § 6601(e)(2)(A).
52. Petition, Mueller v. Commissioner, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1887 (2000) (No. 15289-98).
53. Petitioner’s Response to Request for Admissions at 2, Mueller (15289-98).
54. Id. at 3.
55. Respondent’s Motion to Impose Sanctions, Mueller (15289-98).
56. Order on Motion to Impose Sanctions, Mueller (15289-98).
57. Id.
58. Transcript of Trial at 1 (indicating that the trial began at 9:30 a.m.), 44 (indicating that the trial  concluded
at 10:32 a.m.), Mueller v. Commissioner, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1887 (2000) (No. 15289-98).
59. Id. at 8–33.
over $69,000 in penalties50 (with, of course, interest—compounded daily).51  Mueller promptly
contested the asserted deficiency in Tax Court.52
During the course of this first of two Tax Court cases, Mueller made a general attack on the
marital classifications in the Code.  Early on, he stated that his goal was
to extend to the tax laws the definition of family set forth in Braschi v. Stahl
Associates, 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989):
A more realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a family includes
two adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long-term and
characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and
interdependence.53
So, when the IRS made a request for admissions inquiring about Mueller’s marital status, his
relationship with Bates, and whether the two had applied for a marriage license from the state of
Illinois, Mueller refused to respond to the request on the ground that
he and the group he belongs to are denied the benefits of such a classification.  Also,
because of the U.S.’s stance on gay partners, the Petitioner was denied the sanction
of marriage or a partnership, and, therefore, his status for the entire period in question
cannot be judged by whether or not he was “married”.54
As might be expected, the IRS did not take kindly to Mueller’s refusal to respond to their request for
admissions, filing a motion with the Tax Court to impose sanctions on Mueller.55  The Tax Court
granted this motion and ordered Mueller’s response to the request for admissions stricken as a
sanction.56  The court further ordered that all matters set forth in the IRS’ request  for admissions
would be deemed admitted by Mueller.57
And Mueller didn’t  fair any better at trial.  In the course of a very short trial,58 most of which
consisted of a give and take concerning the admissibility of exhibits into evidence,59 Judge Laro made
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60. Id. at 41.
61. Mueller v. Commissioner, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1887, 1890 (2000).
62. Id. at 1888 (emphasis added).  For a discussion of the general desexualization of gay and lesbian
relationships for U.S. federal tax purposes, see Infanti, supra note 4, at 783–88.
63. Mueller, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1889.
64. Id. at 1889–90.
65. Petitioner’s Brief at 15, Mueller v. Commissioner, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1887 (2000) (No. 15289-98); e.g.,
Petitioner’s Response to Motion to Impose Sanctions, Mueller (15289-98) (indicating that Mueller felt that the courts,
and not the legislature, were the appropriate place to challenge the tax treatment of gay and lesbian couples);
Petitioner’s Response to Request for Admissions, Mueller (15289-98) (discussed in the text above); Transcript of Trial
at 15–24, 28–33, Mueller (15289-98) (attempting to in troduce into evidence various exhibits concerning the tax
treatment of gay and lesbian couples); see also Brief for  Petit ioner  at 10, Mueller v.  Commissioner, 82 T.C.M. (CCH)
764 (2001) (No. 4743-00) (discussing Judge Laro’s misinterpretation); Transcript of Trial at 25–26, Mueller (4743-00)
(same).
it abundant ly clear that he was not receptive to Mueller’s challenge to the tax laws.  He told Mueller
that the “court only interprets existing law,” and admonished him not to make arguments about
changing the law “[b]ecause, frankly, it’s not anything I can relate to.”60  
Unsurprisingly, Judge Laro issued an opinion sustaining the IRS’ proposed deficiencies and
penalties.61  In his opinion, Judge Laro immediately desexualized Mueller’s challenge to the Code’s
discrimination against gay and lesbian couples:
Petitioner’s sole claim in this case is that he should be accorded married, rather than
single, filing status on his tax returns for the years 1989 to 1995.  Petitioner does not
claim to have ever been married.  Rather petitioner argues that he had an “economic
partnership” with his roommate and that he was unconstit utionally denied the
opportunity to file a joint tax return with him in recognition of such partnership.62
The purposefulness of this desexualization was made clear later in the opinion when Judge Laro
stated that “[p]etitioner claims discrimination not as a homosexual but as a person who shares assets
and income with someone who is not his legal spouse.  Petitioner therefore places himself in a class
that includes nonmarried couples of the opposite sex, family members, and friends.”63  Having
desexualized the issue presented to the court, Judge Laro quite easily dismissed what he interpreted
as a new gloss on an old equal protection challenge to the marital classifications in the Code.64
While taking the gay issue off of the table may have made Judge Laro feel more comfortable
and may have allowed him more easily to render his decision in favor of the IRS, Judge Laro engaged
in a far less than charitable reading of the record in Mueller’s case.  In fact, the record is replete with
references to the Code’s discriminatory treatment of gay and lesbian couples—as well as to Mueller’s
self-described “civil disobedience” to bring this issue to light so that it might be addressed in the
appropriate forum.65  In closing, Judge Laro made a nod to these references and told Mueller that if
he wished to petition for redress of any discrimination in the Code against gays and lesbians,  such a
petition would have to be addressed to Congress:
While petitioner makes several arguments on policy and sociological grounds, in the
face of the cases cited above to the contrary, they have no legal bearing on the issues
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66. Mueller, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1890.
67. Mueller v. Commissioner, 2001-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) ¶ 50,390 (2001).
68. Id.
69. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C.
§ 7).
70. Mueller, 2001-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) ¶ 50,390.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Mueller v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 764, 765 (2001).
74. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF TREASURY, FORM 1040:  U.S. INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN
1 (1996), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-96/f1040.pdf (last visited July 28, 2004).
75. Mueller, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) at 765.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
in this case.  Whether policy considerations warrant narrowing of the gap between the
tax treatment of married taxpayers and homosexual and other nonmarried economic
partners is for Congress to determine in light of all the relevant legislative
considerations.66
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Laro’s decision in an unpublished
order.67  The Seventh Circuit reiterated its decision in previous cases that the marital classifications
in the Code do not violate the Constitution,68 and it declined to address Mueller’s challenge to the
federal Defense of Marriage Act69 (DOMA) because that law “was not in effect during the 10-year
period for which Mueller was assessed deficiencies.”70  The Seventh Circuit also indicated that
Mueller had not rebutted the presumption of correctness enjoyed by the IRS’ not ice of deficiency;
his evidence “discussing the status of homosexuals in various countries . . . did not establish that the
Commissioner erred in computing the deficiencies.”71  The court concluded by stating that  Mueller’s
“testimony only reenforced the appropriateness of the deficiencies and additions because he admitted
earning substantial income during the relevant tax years . . . but filing no returns.”72
B. Mueller II
In 1996, Mueller changed his method of protest.  In that year, he did file a tax return—a
return that he had completed jointly with his partner, Todd Bates.  On the return, Mueller listed his
name first and Bates’ name second, striking out the word “spouse” where it appeared in the label
block of the return.73  Mueller marked filing status 2 (“Married filing joint return”),74 but “struck out
the word ‘Married’ on that line so that it read ‘filing joint return’ instead of ‘Married filing joint
return’.”75  Mueller claimed an exemption for a “spouse” on line 6b of the return, and claimed a
standard deduction “based upon his claimed filing status of ‘filing joint return.’”76  Mueller also used
the married filing jointly tax rate schedule.77  He had Bates sign the return on the line below his name,
but again struck out the word “spouse” in the signature block.78
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79. Id.
80. Id.  Mueller was a llowed the benefit of the claimed exemption for Bates;  however, it was classified as a
dependency exemption rather than a spousal exemption.  Id.
81. Transcript of Trial at 15, Mueller v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 764 (2001) (No. 4743-00).
82. As explained by Dorothy Brown: 
A marriage penalty occurs whenever a couple pays higher federal income taxes as a result of their
marriage than they would pay if they remained single and filed individual returns.  A marriage bonus
occurs whenever a couple pays lower federal income taxes as a result of marriage than they would
pay if they remained single and filed individual returns.  Marriage penalties are the greatest where
there are two wage earners; marriage bonuses are the greatest where there is only one wage earner.
Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 787, 787 (1997).  A leading
treatise adds that, “because the rate brackets for a married couple filing jointly are less than twice as wide as those .
. . for unmarried persons, many couples pay more taxes than they would if they could file as unmarried persons.  These
‘marriage penalties’ are greatest for spouses whose incomes are equal and decline and eventually become ‘marriage
bonuses’ as spouses’ incomes become more unequal.”  4 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION
OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 111.3.2, at S111-43 (3rd ed. Supp. 2002 ).
83. Brief for Appellee at 8, 20, Mueller v. Commissioner, 2002-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) ¶ 50,505 (2002) (No. 02-
1189).
84. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C.
§ 7).
85. Brief for Appellee at 9–10, Mueller (02-1189).
In its notice of deficiency, the IRS asserted a deficiency of $8,712 in tax. 79  This deficiency
was due to (i) the reclassification of certain wage income as self-employment income (with a resulting
liability for self-employment tax), (ii) the determination that Mueller was only entitled to the standard
deduction for singles, and (iii) the determination that Mueller was required to use the tax table for
singles in computing his tax.80  Mueller’s tax had been reduced by filing jointly because Bates was
unemployed in 1996.81  Had they been allowed to file a joint return, they would have benefitted from
a marriage “bonus,”82 saving $1,897 in additional taxes.83
Having learned from his prior experience in the Tax Court (when Judge Laro misconstrued
the argument that he was making), Mueller was much more specific, careful, and direct in fashioning
the question that  he wished the court to address in this case.  In contesting the deficiency proposed
by the IRS, Mueller made a direct challenge to the constitutionality of DOMA, which was in force
during his 1996 taxable year and provided that:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States,
the word “marriage” means only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex
who is a husband or a wife.84
Mueller challenged the constitutionality of DOMA on a number of grounds, including equal
pro tection, due process, separation of church and state, and the prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment.85
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86. Transcript of Trial at 12, Mueller v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 764 (2001) (No. 4743-00).
87. Id.; see also id. at 19  (“What the Court will tell  you ultimately is that you’ll probably have to go to
Congress, and there are congressmen who are sympathetic to your position.”).
88. The determination whether a taxpayer is married is general ly made at the close of the taxpayer’s taxable
year.  I.R.C. § 7703(a) (2004).
89. Mueller v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 764, 766 (2001).
90. Absent the application of DOMA, whether a taxpayer is married for federal income tax purposes is
determin ed under state law.  Boyter v. Commissioner, 668 F.2d 1382, 1385 (4th Cir. 1981) (“We agree with the
government’s argument that under the Internal Revenue Code a federal court is bound by state law rather than federal
law when attempting to construe marital status.”).  During 1996, Mueller lived in Illinois and Washington.  Transcript
of Trial at 34–35, Mueller (4743-00).  During that year,  Illinois  enacted a statutory proh ibition on same-sex marr iage.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212(a)(5) (2004)  (effective May 24, 1996).  Although Washington did not enact its statutory
prohibition on same-sex marriage until 1998, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.020(1)(c) (2004) (effective June 11, 1998),
the Washington Court of Appeals had held more than two decades earlier that same-sex marriage is not authorized
under the Washington mar riage statutes.  Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
In petitioning the Supreme Court for review of his case, Mueller noted this problem as well:
Judge Pajak ruled that homosexuals in the Untied States can only use single or head of household
status when i t comes to taxation, while heterosexuals have several additional options.  Both the
respondent and the Court cite the fact that the Petitioner was not married, knowing full well that
such a status is not available to homosexuals.  The Petitioner states that because the status is not
available, de facto discrimination is being used to support the decision.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mueller v. Commissioner, 2002 WL 32135138, at *3 (U.S. Sept. 24, 2002) (No. 02-
513).
91. Mueller, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) at 766.
Mueller’s second Tax Court case was heard by Special Trial Judge Pajak, who proved more
sympathetic to Mueller’s cause than Judge Laro had been.  In fact, at  trial, Judge Pajak told Mueller,
“I’m very sympathetic to your case.”86  Nevertheless, Judge Pajak ultimately sustained the IRS’
proposed deficiency.  Judge Pajak’s thinking was foreshadowed by the comments that followed his
statement at trial in support of Mueller’s cause:  “I think there’s merit in it [i.e., Mueller’s case], but
I think you’re in the wrong forum.  This is a statutory court.  We can only do what the laws say we
can do.”87
As mentioned above, in an attempt to avoid the misconstruction of his arguments by a second
Tax Court judge, Mueller had been more specific in fashioning the question that he wished the court
to address.  But by solving one problem, Mueller had created another.  In his opinion, Judge Pajak
held that DOMA was irrelevant to Mueller’s case.  In 1996, no state recognized same-sex marriage.
As a result, Mueller was unable to marry Bates before the close of his 1996 taxable year.88  Because
Mueller was not married to Bates at any time during 1996, DOMA’s redefinition of marriage as a
union between a man and a woman “effect[ed] no change in the law otherwise applicable in this
case.”89  
Then, completely ignoring the fact that he was actually incorporating DOMA-type
discrimination into the Code by relying on state law to define “marriage,”90 Judge Pajak quickly
concluded that Mueller’s federal tax filing status for 1996 was single, and he reaffirmed Judge Laro’s
earlier conclusion that  the marital classifications in the Code do not violate the Const itution.91  Judge
Pajak closed his discussion of Mueller’s challenge with the same advice that Judge Laro had given:
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92. Id.
93. Mueller v. Commissioner, 2002-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) ¶ 50,505 (2002).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. And a  choice i t was—the IRS did not  even mention the word fr ivolous once in i ts brief to the Seventh
Circuit.  See Brief for  Appellee, Mueller  v. Commissioner, 2002-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) ¶ 50,505 (2002) (No. 02-1189).
Furthermore, the docket for this appeal , which is available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/dkt.htm (last visited July
28, 2004), makes no mention of the IRS having filed a separate motion, as r equired by FED. R. APP. P. 38, requesting
that sanctions be imposed on Mueller for having filed a frivolous appeal.
98. See 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 556 (1978).
99. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 677 (7th ed. 1999); see also, e.g., Berkson v. Gulevsky, 362 F.3d 961, 964
(7th Cir. 2004) (“An appeal is frivolous when the appellant’s arguments are utterly meritless and have no conceivable
chance of success.”); Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 938 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (“An appeal
is ‘frivolous’ when the result is foreordained by the lack of substance to the appellant’s arguments.”).
100. Note that the word “appeals”  in the last sentence of the quoted language in the text above is plural and
that the word “continues” in that same sentence gives the impression that the conduct is ongoing.
101. See supra Part I.
In Mueller I, the Tax Court also observed that whether policy considerations warrant
narrowing of the gap between the tax treatment of married taxpayers and homosexual
and other nonmarried economic partners is for Congress to determine in light of all
relevant legislative considerations.  We agree with all of these statements which
answer petitioner’s pertinent contentions.92
The Seventh Circuit again affirmed the Tax Court’s decision in an unpublished order.93  Like
Judge Pajak, the Seventh Circuit decided that “the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act
[was] irrelevant” to Mueller’s case.94  Also like Judge Pajak, the Seventh Circuit then completely
ignored its incorporat ion of DOMA-type discrimination into the Code when it held that Mueller’s
federal tax filing status for 1996 was single.95  The Seventh Circuit concluded its order with the
following warning:  “We remind Mr. Mueller once again that despite his personal dissatisfaction with
the current tax laws, he does not have license to ignore them.  We also warn Mr. Mueller that  if he
continues to file frivolous tax appeals, he faces the possibility of sanctions.”96
III.  FRIVOLITY
A. The “Force” of Etymology
Frivolous?  The Seventh Circuit’s intent in choosing this rather harsh and derogatory label
is unmistakable.97  Although the word “frivolous” enjoys more than one meaning,98 its meaning is
clear when used as a legal term of art:  “Lacking a legal basis or legal merit; not serious; not
reasonably purposeful.”99  By labeling Mueller’s arguments in both of his Tax Court cases
“frivolous,”100 the Seventh Circuit tainted Mueller’s protest in precisely the fashion that I assiduously
tried to avoid at the outset of this piece.101  They branded Mueller as some sort of a crackpot whose
arguments aren’t even worth considering.  This allowed the court to shove Mueller out  of the
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courthouse and slam the door shut behind him.  The sound of the slamming door can be heard in the
threat to impose sanctions on Mueller102—a threat that effect ively forecloses the possibility of any
future challenges by Mueller to the constitutionality of the Code’s discrimination against gay and
lesbian couples.
The violent imagery of Mueller being shoved out of the courthouse and having the door
slammed shut behind him is actually quite apposite here, because the word “frivolous” etymologically
implies the application of force.103  It has been suggested that the word “frivolous” was probably
borrowed from the Latin word fr§volus (meaning silly, empty, or trifling).104  The Latin fr§volus, in
turn, is a diminutive of a lost adjective fr§vos (meaning broken or crumbled), which  was derived from
the verb fri~re (meaning to break, rub away, or crumble).105
By labeling Mueller’s arguments “frivolous,” the Seventh Circuit applied force to those
arguments, attempting to crumble them in their hands.106  At the same time, the court  clearly
attempted to break Mueller’s spirit, to discourage and dishearten him, to dissuade him from making
future challenges to the constitutionality of the discrimination against gay and lesbian couples that
Congress has embedded in the Code.  And in applying this force to crumble and to break, the court
attempted to rub away, to erase the specter of Mueller (both past and present) from their
consciousness, because they didn’t  want to be reminded of Mueller or of the arguments that he was
making.  They justified this erasure—the effacing of their very discussion of Mueller’s case from the
official public record107—by stating that his arguments were not even worth taking the time to
consider.  But, despite the court’s best efforts, a trace of Mueller remains:  a record where we can
bear witness again to Mueller’s efforts to raise awareness of a wrong and to have that wrong rectified
by the government that committed it.
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This application of force by the court is designed to banish gays and lesbians to the closet, to
make them invisible, to silence them—and is by no means an anomaly in tax.  The open discomfort
at dealing with gay and lesbian issues in the tax laws can also be seen in the act ions of Congress and
the IRS:
In defining marriage for purposes of federal law, DOMA makes no explicit mention
of gay and lesbian couples—even though its purpose is to brand them inferior.  Its
condemnation of homosexuality comes instead by implication and through explanation
in committee reports that few will ever read.  This discomfort at officially and
prominently acknowledging the existence of gay and lesbian couples can also be
detected in the noticeable failure of Congress and the IRS to address the application
of the Code to gay and lesbian couples.  It can additionally be detected in the need to
shoe-horn gay and lesbian couples into desexualized tax categories (e.g., donor-
donee, business partners, or employer-employee) at odds with the reality of their
relationships.  Relationships between gay men and lesbians are apparently so
repugnant that they cannot be acknowledged as such; instead, they must either be
ignored or reshaped into more acceptable, and less loathsome, molds.108
A concerted, forcible silencing of gay and lesbian dissent manifests itself in the microcosm of
Mueller’s case.  After I spent a day in the Tax Court public files room reading through the records
of Mueller’s two Tax Court cases, I was able to see a common thread running through his
submissions to the court:  Mueller felt that a wrong was being done to gays and lesbians, and he
wanted to bring that wrong to the at tention of the appropriate authorities so that it could be rectified.
Mueller had spent years publicly protesting the treatment of gay and lesbian couples under the
Code—feeling so strongly about the issue that he was willing to spend thirteen months in prison 
so he could place these issues before the federal Courts [sic].  He could have had
probation if he would just do as he was told, but he views this as a chance to help the
next generation.  [He] believes the issues presented to the federal Courts [sic] to be
valid Constitutional [sic] questions.  His civil disobedience was justified to serve as
an opportunity for change, to present  issues that need to be addressed to the forums
that can address the issues.109
In bringing this issue out into the open, Mueller was engaging in “protest” in the etymological sense
of that word.  The verb “to  protest” comes from the Latin prÇtest~r§, which means to “declare
publicly, testify, protest (prÇ- forth, before, pro- + test~r§ testify,  from testis witness).”110  Mueller
was declaring publicly, testifying about the discrimination that he and others had suffered under the
Code.  Yet,  despite his plaintive testimony, Mueller was turned away (literally or figurat ively) each
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time; he kept asking where he should go to press his case, but everyone’s answer seemed to be “not
here.”
Mueller had thought about going to Congress, but, given its overt hostility toward gay and
lesbian couples,111 he knew that it would not be receptive to his arguments.112  He asked the IRS to
recognize his relationship with Bates, but was told that if he wanted to be a test case he would need
to get into the court system and seek change there.113  In his criminal tax case, Mueller pressed his
claim that the discrimination against gays and lesbians in the Code vio lated a number of rights
guaranteed to him by the U.S. Constitution.114  But the Department of Justice attorneys who were
prosecuting him argued that a criminal trial was likewise not the appropriate forum for his protest;
they contended that Mueller should seek the relief that he desired in a civil tax case.115  When Mueller
finally made it into the Tax Court, he met with varying levels of receptivity to his arguments, but, in
the end, was told by two different judges that civil court was not the right forum for his protest either
and that he should petition Congress for redress—the same Congress that he had earlier concluded
it would be pointless to approach.  Then, to make sure that Mueller could in no way misunderstand
his being rebuffed, the Seventh Circuit labeled his arguments frivolous and told him not to darken
their door again.
Viewed from this perspective, Mueller’s story is both frustrating and depressing.  After
reading through Mueller’s Tax Court  files, I felt  a cloud of despondency set tle all around me as I was
sitting in the airport waiting for my flight home.  I could only imagine how discouraged and
disheartened Mueller must have felt after engaging in this long and ultimately futile search for
someone to hear his protest and to rectify the wrong that was being done to him and Bates—and
every other gay and lesbian couple in the United States.  Mueller’s story almost makes you feel as if
all of the advances in gay rights over the past several decades—advances that have helped to move
gay and lesbian issues out of the closet and into the light—have had no effect upon those who make,
enforce, or interpret the federal tax laws.
B. The Frivolity of “Frivolousness”
Almost—but not quite.  This concerted application of force is, in fact, a reaction to these very
advances.  Without the advances and Mueller’s attempt at furthering them, there would be no need
for a reactionary application of force.  Thus, once we recognize the force being applied against
Mueller, we can see more clearly the two opposing forces at work in his case:  a force attempting to
effect change and a force attempting to resist change.  Through the simple expedient of this shift in
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context, we can begin to see Mueller’s story in an entirely different light.  No longer mired in a
narrow, oppressive tax perspective,116 we can see Mueller’s struggle from a wider, more hopeful
perspective that embraces the entire gay rights movement.117  And, in this different light, we will see
the Seventh Circuit ’s words turned on their head, revealing just how very frivolous the court’s
attempt to  disparage Mueller’s arguments was.118
1.  A Wider Perspective:  Human Rights.  In his submissions, Mueller repeatedly claimed that
the Code’s discriminatory treatment of gay and lesbian couples constitutes a violation of human
rights.119  However, none of the courts that heard Mueller’s tax cases ever addressed this issue.
Nonetheless, we will briefly explore the treatment of sexual orientation discrimination as a human
rights issue, because it is an integral part of the progressive force that opposes and resists the
reactionary force that Congress, the IRS, the Tax Court, and the Seventh Circuit all brought to bear
against Mueller.
a.  European Court of Human Rights.  More than twenty years ago, the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) began the “development of international human rights law in the area
of gay and lesbian sexuality”120 by holding that Northern Ireland’s sodomy laws violated article 8 of
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Convention).121
Article 8 of the Convention provides that “[e]veryone has the right to respect  for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.”122  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the ECHR
reaffirmed its interpretation of article 8 in finding that the sodomy laws of Ireland and Cyprus also
violated the Convention. 123
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Even though not all of the ECHR’s decisions over the past twenty years concerning sexual
orientation and gender identity have been positive,124 commentators have noted that the ECHR has
become “increasingly receptive to human rights claims brought by lesbian and gay applicants” since
the late 1990s.125  For example, the ECHR has held that:
! Employing different ages of consent for heterosexual and homosexual relat ions
violated article 14 of the Convention (taken in conjunction with article 8 of the
Convention).126  Article 14 provides that “[t]he enjoyment of the rights and freedoms
set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground
such as sex . . . or other status.”127  
! The United Kingdom’s ban on gays and lesbians serving in the military violated article
8 of the Convention.128
! A Portuguese appellate court  violated article 14 of the Convention (taken in
conjunction with article 8 of the Convention) when it overturned a lower court ruling
awarding custody of a young girl to her father because of his sexual orientat ion.129
! The criminalization of homosexual relations between more than two men in private
violated article 8 of the Convention.130
! The failure legally to recognize the reassigned sex of a post-operative transsexual
violated article 8 of the Convention.  The ECHR further held that the individual’s
inability to marry someone of the sex opposite her reassigned sex violated article 12
of the Convention, 131 which provides that “[m]en and women of marriageable age
have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws
governing the exercise of this right.”132  
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! An Austrian Supreme Court decision denying the surviving member of a same-sex
couple the benefit of a rent law, which permitted surviving life companions to succeed
to decedent companions’ tenancies, violated article 14 of the Convention (taken in
conjunction with article 8).133
b.  U.N. Human Rights Committee.  The United Nations Human Rights Committee
has on several occasions considered the application of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) to sexual orientation discrimination.134  In 1994, the Human Rights
Committee found that Tasmania’s sodomy law violated the right of privacy embodied in article 17
of the ICCPR.135  In that decision, the Human Rights Committee also noted that the references to
“sex” in articles 2 and 26 of the ICCPR, which guarantee equal protection of the law without regard
to status, include sexual orientation within their ambit.136  The Human Rights Committee later
reaffirmed this interpretation of article 26 of the ICCPR in another case brought against Australia.
In that case, the Human Rights Committee held that Australia’s denial of pension benefits to the
surviving same-sex partner of a veteran violated art icle 26 where those same benefits would have
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been provided to  the surviving opposite-sex partner of a veteran (whether or not the two had been
married).137
In a case brought against New Zealand, the Human Rights Committee held that the ICCPR
does not obligate states that have ratified the treaty to extend the right to marry to same-sex
couples.138  This interpretation was based on the language of article 23(2) of the ICCPR, which
guarantees “[t]he right of men and women of marriageable age to marry.”139  The Human Rights
Committee noted that, in contrast to the other provisions of the ICCPR, art icle 23(2) “is the only
substantive provision in the [ICCPR] which defines a right using the term ‘men and women’, rather
than ‘every human being’, ‘everyone’ and ‘all persons’.”140  Two members of the committee wrote
an opinion concurring in this interpretat ion of the ICCPR, but concomitantly issued the following
warning:
As to the Committee’s unanimous view that it cannot find a violat ion of art icle
26, either, in the non-recognition as marriage of the same-sex relationships between
the authors, we wish to add a few observations.  This conclusion should not be read
as a general statement that differential treatment between married couples and same-
sex couples not allowed under the law to marry would never amount to a violation of
art icle 26.  On the contrary, the Committee’s jurisprudence supports the position that
such differentiation may very well, depending on the circumstances of a concrete case,
amount to prohibited discrimination.
Contrary to what was asserted by the State party . . ., it is the established view
of the Committee that the prohibition against discrimination on grounds of “sex” in
article 26 comprises also discrimination based on sexual orientat ion.  And when the
Committee has held that certain differences in the treatment of married couples and
unmarried heterosexual couples were based on reasonable and objective criteria and
hence not discriminatory, the rationale of this approach was in the ability of the
couples in question to choose whether to marry or not to marry, with all the entailing
consequences.  No such possibility of choice exists for same-sex couples in countries
where the law does not allow for same-sex marriage or other type of recognized
same-sex partnership with consequences similar to or identical with those of marriage.
Therefore, a denial of certain rights or benefits to same-sex couples that are available
to married couples may amount to discrimination prohibited under article 26, unless
otherwise justified on reasonable and objective criteria.141
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Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference:  A Postscript on Lawrence
v. Texas, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 913, 915 (2004) (in  referrin g to the Lawrence case, stating th at, “[ f]or the first time in
history, a majority of the Supreme Court has relied on an intern ational  tribunal decision to interpr et individual libert ies
embodied in the U.S. Constitution”).
2.  A Wider Perspective:  Constitutional Rights.  This “very strong international trend towards
treating sexual orientation as a suspect classification under . . .  human rights treaties”142 has now
begun to affect the decisions of U.S. courts.  In Lawrence v. Texas,143 more than twenty years after
the ECHR decision in Dudgeon and some nine years after the Human Rights Committee’s decision
in Toonen, the U.S. Supreme Court finally overruled Bowers v. Hardwick144 and struck down Texas’
sodomy law on the ground that it violated the right to liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  Notably, in reaching its decision in
Lawrence, the Supreme Court specifically referred to the ECHR and its decision in the Dudgeon case:
The sweeping references by Chief Justice Burger [in Bowers] to the history
of Western civilization and to Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards did not take
account of other authorities pointing in an opposite direction. . . .
Of even more importance, almost five years before Bowers was decided the
European Court of Human Rights considered a case with parallels to Bowers and to
today’s case.  An adult male resident in Northern Ireland alleged he was a practicing
homosexual who desired to engage in consensual homosexual conduct.   The laws of
Northern Ireland forbade him that right. He alleged that he had been questioned, his
home had been searched, and he feared criminal prosecution.  The court held that the
laws proscribing the conduct were invalid under the European Convention on Human
Rights.  Dudgeon v United Kingdom . . . . Authoritative in all countries that are
members of the Council of Europe (21 nations then, 45 nations now), the decision is
at odds with the premise in Bowers that the claim put forward was insubstantial in
our Western civilization.145
As Harold Hongju Koh has noted, “[d]espite nearly a half century of coexistence between the
United States Supreme Court and the [ECHR], Lawrence was the first U.S. Supreme Court majority
opinion ever to cite an ECHR judgment in the text of its opinion.”146  A few pages later, the Court
again referred to international human rights law:
To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it
should be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected
elsewhere.  The European Court of Human Rights has followed not Bowers but its
own decision in Dudgeon v United Kingdom. . . . Modinos v Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art4
3-Aug-04] TAX PROTEST 25
147. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576–77.
148. Koh, supra note 146, at 50; Neuman, supra note 134, at 89–90.
149. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
150. Id. at 623.
151. Id. at 624.
152. Id. at 635.
153. Id. at 632.
154. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586–605 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Richard Lessner, Judicial
Tyranny, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2003, at B4; William Safire, The Bedroom Door, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2003, at A21;
David G. Savage, Ruling Seen as Precursor to Same-Sex Marriages, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 2003, pt. 1 at  21;  Cheryl
Wetzstein, Gay “Marriages” Ahead; Debate Stirs in the States, WASH. TIMES, July 13, 2003, at A1.
R. (1993); Norris v Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H. R. (1988).  Other nations, too,  have
taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults
to engage in intimate, consensual conduct.  See Brief for Mary Robinson et al. as
Amici Curiae 11-12.  The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as
an integral part of human freedom in many other countries.  There has been no
showing that in this country the governmental interest in circumscribing personal
choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent.147
In this passage, the Court cited the pages in Mary Robinson’s amicus brief that refer to the Human
Rights Committee’s 1994 decision in Toonen (finding that Tasmania’s sodomy law violated article
17 of the ICCPR) and to the action taken by Australia to implement the committee’s decision.148
Several years before Lawrence, the Supreme Court had already eroded the force of Bowers
when it decided Romer v. Evans.149  In Romer, the Court struck down an anti-gay amendment to the
Colorado Constitution (commonly referred to as “Amendment 2”) on the ground that it violated the
Equal Protect ion Clause of the U.S. Constitution.150  Amendment 2 prohibited “all legislative,
executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect . . . gays and
lesbians.”151  The Court found that Colorado had “classified homosexuals . . . to make them unequal
to everyone else,” essentially rendering gays and lesbians “stranger[s] to its laws.”152  The Court held
that Amendment 2 could not even withstand the lenient rational basis test:
First, the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and
undifferentiated disability on a single named group, an exceptional and, as we shall
explain, invalid form of legislation.  Second, its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with
the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but
animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state
interests.153
3.  A Wider Perspective:  The States and Same-Sex Marriage.  In the wake of Romer and
Lawrence, many opponents of same-sex marriage now fear (and many proponents of same-sex
marriage now hope) that one of the Court’s next steps in the gay rights area will be to strike down
prohibitions against same-sex marriage on constitutional grounds.154  Over the past decade, there has
been movement among the several states toward recognizing the fact that same-sex couples in the
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155. Exceptions include California and New Jersey, which have both enacted domestic partnership regist ries.
Beginning January 1, 2005, the rights and benefits of marriage are being extended to California domestic partners.
2003 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 421, § 4 (West) (to be codified at CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5).   It is worth noting that the New
Jersey Domestic Par tnership Act, 2003 N.J. Sess.  Law Serv. ch. 246 (West), which does not provide the full panoply
of rights and benefits accorded to mar ried couples, see Editorial, Still Not First-Class Citizens, STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
N.J.), July 8, 2004, at 18, was enacted while a court challenge to the New Jersey marriage laws was pending.  See
Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Brief at 3–4 & 45 n.10, Lewis v. Harris, No. A-2244–3T5 (N.J. May 6, 2004), available at 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/binary-data/LAMBDA_PDF/pdf/281.pdf (last visited July 28, 2004).   The New Jersey
domestic partnership act went into effect on July 10, 2004.  Peggy O’Crowley, Gay Pairs Set to Party as Domestic
Partners, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), July 9, 2004, at 17; Katie Wang, United They Stand, Under New
Law—Up to 700 Same-Sex Jersey Couples Register as Domestic Partners on Act’s First Day, July 11, 2004, at 23.
156. For a description of the difficult planning issues that arise as a result of this patchwork, see Jill Schachner
Chanen, The Changing Face of Gay Legal Issues, 90 A.B.A. J. 47 (2004).
157. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
158. Id. at 64.
159. Id. at 67.
160. Baehr v. Miike, CIV No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
161. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23.
162. Baehr v. Anderson, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391, at *6 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999).
163. Act 383, 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 383.  Like the amendment to the Hawaii Constitution, this law was
passed while the Baehr case was pending and was an effort to “derail[]” that case.  Susan Essoyan, Domestic-Partner
Law a Bust, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1997, at A5; see also Bettina Boxall, A New Era Set to Begin in Benefits for Gay
United States are not afforded the same possibility of recognition through marriage as are
heterosexual couples.  This movement has primarily taken place in state courts,155 and has resulted
in a patchwork of different types (and levels) of recognition for same-sex couples.156
The movement began in 1993 with the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision in Baehr v. Lewin.157
In that case, a plurality of the court found that Hawaii’s marriage laws discriminated on the basis of
sex by limiting the issuance of marriage licenses to opposite-sex couples.158  The court  held this
discrimination to be a presumptive violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Hawaii
Constitution—a presumption that the state could rebut only by showing that (i) the sex-based
classification in the statute was justified by a compelling state interest and (ii) “the statute is narrowly
drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgments of . . . constitutional rights.”159  After a hearing on remand,
the trial court found that the state could not meet this heavy burden, and therefore held that Hawaii’s
marriage laws violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Hawaii Constitution.160  
While an appeal was pending before the Hawaii Supreme Court, the state constitution was
amended in 1998 to empower the state legislature to limit marriage to opposite-sex couples.161  In
December 1999, the Hawaii Supreme Court took judicial notice of this amendment to  the
constitution, and held that the amendment validated Hawaii’s marriage laws “by taking the statute
out of the ambit of the equal protect ion clause of the Hawaii Constitution, at  least insofar as the
statute, both on its face and as applied, purported to limit access to the marital status to opposite-sex
couples.”162  It is worth noting that even though same-sex marriages were never legalized in Hawaii,
the state legislature did pass a law allowing any two persons legally prohibited from marrying
(including, but not limited to, same-sex couples) to register as “reciprocal beneficiaries,” a status that
allows the pair to obtain a limited number of rights and benefits accorded to married couples under
Hawaii law.163
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Couples, L.A. TIMES, July 7, 1997, at A3.
164. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743, at *1 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998).
165. Id. at *3 to *6.
166. Id. at *6.
167. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25.
168. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 877–86 (Vt. 1999).
169. VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 7.
170. Baker, 744 A.2d at 886–87.
171. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2004).
172. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 960–68 (Mass. 2003).
173. Id. at 969.
174. Id. at 970.
Similarly, an Alaska trial court held in 1998 that “marriage, i.e., the recognition of one’s
choice of a life partner, is a fundamental right.”164  Accordingly, in the court’s view, limiting the
issuance of marriage licenses to opposite-sex couples raised the specter of a violation of both the right
to privacy and the right to equal protect ion of the law found in the Alaska Constitution.165
Accordingly, the trial court held that the state would be required to show a compelling interest
justifying the abridgment of these constitutionally protected rights.166  However, before a hearing
could be held to determine whether the state could make this showing, the Alaska Constitution was
amended to limit marriage to opposite-sex couples.167
In 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court held that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the
rights and benefits attendant to marriage violated the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont
Constitution.168  This clause provides “[t]hat government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common
benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or community, and not for the particular
emolument or advantage of any single person, family, or set of persons, who are a part only of that
community.”169  Because the court  held only that  “plaintiffs are entitled under Chapter I, Article 7,
of the Vermont Constitution to obtain the same benefits and protections afforded by Vermont law
to married opposite-sex couples,” it left open to the state legislature the choice of affording same-sex
couples either the right to marry or some other recognition of their relationships that would offer
them the benefits and protections accorded to married couples.170  In the end, the Vermont legislature
chose to enact a civil union law that affords same-sex couples all of the benefits and protections
associated with marriage.171
Most recently, in 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that excluding same-
sex couples from access to civil marriage violates both the due process and equal protection
guarantees in the Massachuset ts Constitution.172  To remedy this violation, the court reformulated
“civil marriage to mean the voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to the exclusion of all others.
This reformulation redresse[d] the plaintiffs’ constitutional injury and further[ed] the aim of marriage
to promote stable, exclusive relationships.”173  The court then stayed its judgment for 180 days “to
permit the Legislature to take such action as it may deem appropriate in light of [the court’s]
opinion.”174  
During this 180-day period, the Massachusetts Senate submitted a question to the Supreme
Judicial Court, asking it whether the enactment of a law prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying
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175. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 566 (2004).
176. Id. at 569.
177. Pam Belluck, Hundreds of Same-Sex Couples Wed in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2004, at A1.
178. JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLO GY 158 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., 1997).
179. Id.  Literally, this statement is translated as “there is no outside-text.”  Id.
180. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Deconstruction ,Structuralism, Antisemitism and the Law, 36 B.C. L. REV.
1, 17 (1994).
181. Mueller v. Commissioner, 2002-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) ¶ 50,505 (2002) (emphasis added).
182. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mueller v. Commissioner, 2002 WL 32135138, at *7 (U.S. Sept. 24, 2002)
(No. 02-513) (“Congress felt bold enough to codify discrimination against homosexuals in 1996 with the Defense of
Marr iage Act.  Th e discr imination  has been present for many years,  but it  has seldom been so openly demonstrated
as in 1996.”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mueller v. Commissioner, 2001 WL 34115848, at *6 (U.S. July 5, 2001)
(No. 01-44) (same); see also Infanti, supra note 4, at 780–83 (describing this move from latent to patent hostility).
but allowing them to form civil unions would satisfy the constitutional concerns raised by the court
in its opinion. 175  The court answered that it would not:
The same defects of rationality evident in the marriage ban considered in Goodridge
are evident in, if not exaggerated by, Senate No. 2175.  Segregating same-sex unions
from opposite-sex unions cannot possibly be held rationally to advance or “preserve”
what we stated in Goodridge were the Commonwealth’s legitimate interests in
procreat ion, child rearing, and the conservation of resources. . . . Because the
proposed law by its express terms forbids same-sex couples entry into civil marriage,
it continues to relegate same-sex couples to a different status.  The holding in
Goodridge, by which we are bound, is that group classifications based on
unsupportable distinctions, such as that embodied in the proposed bill, are invalid
under the Massachusetts Constitution.  The history of our nation has demonstrated
that separate is seldom, if ever, equal.176
On May 17, 2004, the first same-sex couples were legally married in Massachusetts.177
4.  The Unbounded Text.  As Jacques Derrida has stated, “il n’y a pas de hors-texte.”178  This
statement, which has been translated as “[t]here is nothing outside of the text,”179 means that  relevant
interpretational context is boundless.180  In pondering Mueller’s story, it is toward this boundlessness
that we have naturally been led.  By recognizing and tracing the outlines of the force behind the words
of the Seventh Circuit, we have been able to leave behind a bounded, myopic view of the text of
Mueller’s civil tax cases and to move instead toward an unbounded view that infuses the Seventh
Circuit’s words with new meaning.
The Seventh Circuit warned Mueller that “if he continues to file frivolous tax appeals, he faces
the possibility of sanctions.”181  These “frivolous” arguments challenged the sexual orientation
discrimination that had been tacitly present in the Code for decades—until Congress made its
discriminatory intent explicit in 1996 by enacting DOMA.182  But how frivolous do these arguments
really seem when we consider them against the background of the expanded horizon sketched above?
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183. See supra Part III.B.1.
184. E.g., Karner v.  Austria, 38 Eur. H.R.  Rep. 24 (2003) (affording benefits of rent law to surviving member
of a same-sex couple);  Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18 (2002) (affording recognition to the
reassigned sex of a transsexual); Young v. Australia, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Commun ication No.  941/2000,  Doc.
No. CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000 (Sept. 18, 2003) (affording pension benefits to surviving member of a same-sex couple);
Joslin v. New Zealand, app., U.N. Human  Rights Comm., Communication No. 902/1999, Doc. No.
CCPR/C/75/D/902/1999 (July 30, 2002) (holding that the ICCPR does not require a state party to extend the right to
marry to same-sex couples, but stating, in a concurring opinion, that this holding does not mean that differential
treatment of same-sex couples cannot constitute a violation of the ICCPR).
185. See supra Part III.B.2.
186. See supra Part III.B.2.
187. See supra note 154.
188. Polls show that a majority of Americans “support equal access to the specific obligations,  responsibil ities
and recognitions of marriage.”  Nat’l Gay & Lesbian Task Force, Recent National Polls on Same-Sex Marriage and
Civil Unions 1 (2004), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/marriagecenter/RecentNationalMarch2004.pdf (last
visited July 28, 2004).
189. See supra Part III.B.3.
190. See supra note 155.
191. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
Both the ECHR and the Human Rights Committee have strong records of acknowledging and
rectifying sexual orientation discrimination as a human rights matter.183  Importantly, a number of
these decisions directly address the issue of according legal recognition to same-sex couples.184  In
Romer and Lawrence, the U.S. Supreme Court also acknowledged and rectified sexual orientation
discrimination as a constitutional matter.185  In Lawrence, the Court even referred, explicitly or
implicitly, to decisions of the ECHR and the Human Rights Committee in reaching its own decision.186
In the wake of Lawrence, many opponents of same-sex marriage now fear (and many proponents of
same-sex marriage now hope) that one of the Court’s next steps in the gay rights area will be to strike
down prohibitions against same-sex marriage.187  These fears (and hopes) are stoked by the growing
recognition that excluding same-sex couples from the benefits and protections associated with
marriage is unjustified and unjustifiable.188  Court decisions in Hawaii, Alaska, Vermont, and
Massachusetts have all found that prohibitions against same-sex marriage violate provisions in their
state constitutions.189  To rectify this discrimination, Hawaii permits same-sex couples to register as
reciprocal beneficiaries, Vermont allows same-sex couples to enter into civil unions,  and
Massachusetts permits same-sex couples to marry.  In addition, the California and New Jersey
legislatures have each enacted statutes allowing same-sex couples to register as domestic partners.190
These decisions and developments, many of which occurred before the Seventh Circuit issued
either of its opinions in Mueller’s civil tax cases, undermine that court’s bald assertion that Mueller’s
arguments were “frivolous.”  With courts at all levels—internat ional, national, and state—recognizing
and rectifying instances of what can only be described as pervasive sexual orientation discrimination,
how can it be meritless to ask a court to recognize and rectify the sexual orientation discrimination
that exists in the federal tax laws?  Obviously, like the court in Bowers v. Hardwick, the judges on
the Seventh Circuit (and, for that matter, in the Tax Court) chose to turn a blind eye to the world
around them.  To paraphrase the Supreme Court in Lawrence, these numerous decisions and
developments in gay rights over more than two decades are at odds with the Seventh Circuit’s
premise that the claims put forward by Mueller were insubstantial.191
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192. As Vivian Curran and J. M.  Balkin have both explained, the applicat ion of deconstructive techniques
to a text is not a random occurrence.  Curran states that
Derrida has made clear that deconstruction is applied in response to textua l components:
“[Deconstruction is an] incision, precisely [because] it can  be made only according to lines of force
and forces of ruptur e that are localizable in the discourse to be deconstructed.”  Moreover, in his
keynote speech at the 1990 “Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice” colloquium at Cardozo
Law School, Derrida again made clear that the deconstructionist exploration of meaning through
hierarchy reversal is not imposed randomly, but, rather, on those word combinations whose
juxtapositions draw the attention of the deconstructionist to the likelihood of rich  interpretive
possibilities.
Curran, supra note 180, at 21 (quoting Positions: Interview with Jean-Louis Houdebine and Guy Scarpetta, in JACQUES
DERRIDA, POSITIONS 37, 41 (Alan Bass trans., 1981)) (citation omitted).  Balkin agrees that “[w]e deconstruct a
particular text because we think that the text has a particular form of richness that speaks to us, either  for good or  for
ill,” and, in considering why one deconstructs Plato or Saussure but not a laundry list or the back of a cereal box, he
further  asserts that “in each case, one deconstructs because one has a particular ax to gr ind, whether it  be a
philosophical,  ideological,  moral, or political ax.” Balkin, supra note 103, at 1626S27; see also J. M. Balkin, Being
Just with Deconstruction, 3 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 393, 399 (1994) (“So the target of deconstruction, and the way that
the particular deconstructive argument is wielded, may vary with the moral and political commitments of the
deconstructor.”); J. M. Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1131, 1138
(1994) (“I shall argue that Derrida’s encounter with justice really shows that deconstructive argument is a species of
rhetor ic, which can be used for different purposes depending upon the moral and political commitments of the
deconstructor.”); J. M. Balkin, Understanding Legal  Understanding:  The Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal
Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 105, 124S27 & n.34 (1993) (“One could engage in deconst ruction of a legal text without
the desire to offer a nor mative alternative, or without a belief that the difficulties one found in the text were due to
failures of substantive rationality . . . .  However, the deconstruction practiced by legal critics is almost always rational
deconstruction, because it seeks to criticize law on the basis of some proposed normative alterna tive.”  (cita tion
omitted)).
Once we abandon the court’s bounded, myopic view of Mueller’s tax cases in favor of a more
realistic, unbounded view that allows us to see Mueller and his arguments in a broader context, it
becomes clear that the Seventh Circuit’s assertion about the meritoriousness of Mueller’s arguments
was itself without merit.  Suddenly, this serious threat seems rather silly and groundless.  In other
words, it appears that it was the Seventh Circuit (and not Mueller) who was making frivolous
arguments in this case (arguments that were frivolous in all senses of the word).  And even if the
Seventh Circuit’s assertion were somehow considered plausible when made in June 2002, that
plausibility has been severely eroded (if not completely washed away) by the additional developments
that have occurred since that time.
C. Facing a Choice
Having recognized the vapidity of the Seventh Circuit’s epithet/threat, where does that leave
us?  Has this deconstructionist meditation merely killed some time with interesting word play at the
expense of some judges in Illinois?  Or is there a larger meaning to what we are contemplating here
that is somehow redolent of the themes of openness and freedom suggested by the title of this
symposium?192
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Derrida has spoken to this issue as well:  “Taking a position in philosophy: nothin g ‘shocks’ me less, of
course.  Why engage in a work of deconstruction, rather than leave things the way they are, etc.?  Nothing here,
without a ‘show of force’ somewhere.  Deconstruction, I have insisted is not neutral.  It intervenes.”  Positions:
Interview with Jean-Louis Houdebine and Guy Scarpetta, in JACQUES DERRIDA, POSITIONS 37, 93 (Alan Bass trans.,
1981); see also DERRIDA, supra note 103, 178, at 161S64 (explaining his “exorbitant” choice of certain of Rousseau’s
texts for deconstruction).
193.  Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C.
§ 7).  DOMA also permits other states to refuse to recognize these marriages.  Id. § 2(a),  110 Stat.  at 2419 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C).
194. Because Massachusetts has resisted allowing nonresidents to marry, it is unlikely that the question of
interstate recognition of a Massachusetts same-sex marriage under DOMA and the Full Faith and Credit Clause will
arise in more than a handful of cases in the near future.  Jessica Bennett, P-Town Follows Order, for Now, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 27, 2004, at B2; Michael H. Hodges, Gay Wedding Bells Ring—In Canada, DETROIT NEWS, June 2, 2004,
at 1D.  A number of out-of-state couples have, however, filed lawsuits challenging the validity of the law upon which
the state’s resistance is based.  Pam Belluck, Eight Diverse Gay Couples Join to Fight Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES,
June 18, 2004, at A22; Elizabeth Mehren, Couples, Officials Target Marriage Law, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 2004, at A18.
195. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
Between May 17, 2004 and the end of the calendar year, hundreds of same-sex couples will
have been married in Massachusetts.  Although these marriages will be legally recognized for
Massachusetts state law purposes, DOMA prevents them from being recognized at the federal
level.193  Most of the same-sex couples who get married in Massachusetts will probably not encounter
the practicalities of this difference in treatment until some time between January 1 and April 15, 2005,
when they sit down to complete a U.S. federal income tax return.194  As the epigraph to this piece
indicates, the IRS has recently reaffirmed its adherence to the holding in Mueller’s civil tax cases,
stating that “[a] taxpayer in [a same-sex marriage] may not claim the status of a married person on
the federal income tax return.”195
Thus, each of these married same-sex couples will be faced with an unavoidable choice.  On
the one hand, they can choose to be intimidated by a show of reactionary force, to file separate
returns on which they check the “single” box, to follow the “law” as interpreted by the Seventh
Circuit and the IRS, and, ultimately, to remain locked in the darkness of the tax closet .  Or, on the
other hand, they can choose to dismiss the empty threats, to follow Mueller’s example by filing joint
returns, to risk the negative repercussions that may follow, and, ultimately, to attempt to kick the tax
closet door wide open and finally let in the light.  Squarely pointed in the direction of the next front
in the bat tle for gay rights, these couples can either retreat into  darkness or stand and fight in the
light—the choice will soon be theirs.
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